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We employ dynamic threshold partial adjustment models to study the asymmetries in firms’
adjustments toward their target leverage. Using a sample of US firms during 2002–2012, we docu-
ment a negative impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the speed of leverage adjustment. In our
subperiod analysis, we find moderate evidence of cross-sectional heterogeneity in this speed, which
seems more pronounced pre-crisis and provides little support for the financial constraint view. For
the pre-crisis period, more constrained firms, such as those with high growth, with large invest-
ment, of small size, and with volatile earnings, adjust their capital structures more quickly than
their less constrained counterparts. These firms rely heavily on external funds to offset their large
financing deficits, suggesting that their higher adjustment speeds may be driven by lower adjust-
ment costs that are shared with the transaction costs of accessing external capital markets. For the
crisis period, the speed of adjustment only varies with the deviation from target leverage, with only
firms having sufficiently large deviations attempting to revert to the target, albeit slowly. Overall,
our results provide new evidence of both cross-sectional and time-varying asymmetries in capital
structure adjustments, which is consistent with the trade-off theory.
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1 Introduction
Since the irrelevance theorem by Modigliani and Miller (1958), three main views of corporate capi-
tal structure have been advanced in which the method of financing matters: the trade-off theory, the
pecking order theory, and the market timing hypothesis. The trade-off theory, in both its static and
dynamic forms, predicts an optimal capital structure that balances the costs (e.g., financial distress
costs) against the benefits (e.g., debt interest tax shield) of debt financing; see, for example, Kraus and
Litzenberger (1973) for a static trade-off model and Strebulaev (2007) for a dynamic model. Under
this framework, corporate leverage is predicted to exhibit mean reversion as firms seek to adjust toward
their target leverage. The pecking order theory, based on asymmetric information and adverse selec-
tion, suggests that a firm’s observed mix of debt and equity simply reflects its cumulative financing
decisions over time, whereby internal finance is preferred over external finance and debt is preferred
over equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984). The market timing hypothesis posits that capital
structure decisions are driven by market timing considerations in which firms attempt to time the equity
markets by issuing shares when market conditions are favorable (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Neither
the pecking order theory nor the market timing hypothesis predicts the existence of target leverage ra-
tios and firms’ adjustments toward those targets. Hence, a large body of empirical research has tested
the trade-off theory against these alternative views of capital structure by examining whether and how
fast firms move toward target leverage; see Frank and Goyal (2007) for a comprehensive survey.
Existing studies so far have mainly used a linear, partial adjustment model of leverage to estimate
the speed of adjustment (hereafter SOA), i.e., the speed with which firms adjust their capital structures
toward target leverage. For example, Flannery and Rangan (2006) find that over the period 1965–
2001, US firms adjust at a rate of 34% per year. Examining international data in the G-5 countries,
Antoniou et al. (2008) also document reasonably fast adjustment speeds for firms in the US (32%), the
UK (32%), and France (39%). Taken together, these empirical studies provide evidence of active target
adjustment behavior as predicted by the trade-off framework.
Most recent research has begun to investigate two important issues in the study of the SOA, issues
that have not been thoroughly investigated by the aforementioned studies. The first issue is how to
obtain a consistent estimate of the SOA in short, dynamic panels with (unobserved) firm fixed effects,
in which the precision of the estimate is highly sensitive to the econometric methods and procedures
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used (e.g., Huang and Ritter, 2009; Flannery and Hankins, 2013).1 The second issue, which is the fo-
cus of this paper, is whether there exists asymmetry in target adjustment behavior such that firms take
different paths toward their target leverage, at potentially heterogeneous rates. One main source of the
heterogeneity in the SOA is the differential adjustment costs facing firms with different characteristics
or at different positions relative to their target leverage. Dynamic trade-off models, for example, sug-
gest that firms may have a range of leverage targets and that they only adjust their capital structures
when the costs of adjustment can be offset by the benefits of adjustment (i.e., the benefits of being close
to or at leverage targets) (Fischer et al., 1989; Leary and Roberts, 2005). An important implication fol-
lows that the magnitude and speed of the adjustment are dependent on how far the actual leverage ratio
is from the target ratio. Firms deviating from target leverage may have an incentive to undertake quick
adjustment, especially when they face a fixed adjustment cost.
Another source of heterogeneity in the SOA is the time-series variation in macroeconomic condi-
tions that affect corporate leverage and dynamic leverage adjustment. According to the credit channel
theory, leverage is pro-cyclical because firms borrow less during an economic downturn, when their
balance sheets and financial conditions (e.g., the value of their collateral) deteriorate (Bernake and
Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). Moreover, Hackbarth et al. (2006) show theoretically that
firms adjust their capital structures more frequently in economic expansions than in recessions. The
leverage rebalancing thresholds are higher in recessions because the leverage adjustment costs tend to
increase under adverse macroeconomic conditions. These arguments suggest that the stage of the busi-
ness cycle should be positively related to the SOA. The recent Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009
and the resulting economic recession provide an excellent testing ground for this relationship. Several
studies show, for example, that the crisis had dramatic effects on corporate financial policies (Campello
et al., 2010; Duchin et al., 2010; Campello et al., 2011). Overall, the above arguments and findings
indicate that the SOA should vary over time, being lower during the crisis period.
In this paper, we address these important empirical issues regarding the estimation of SOA and
asymmetries in capital structure adjustments. Our contribution is two-fold. First, we are the first to ex-
amine both the cross-sectional and time-varying heterogeneity in the SOA. Second, we employ a new
approach using dynamic threshold partial adjustment models of leverage, which enables us to con-
1It is well-established in the literature that the pooled OLS estimates of the SOA (Fama and French, 2002) are biased
downward and the fixed-effects estimates (Flannery and Rangan, 2006) are biased upward, while the GMM (Ozkan, 2001)
and system GMM estimates (Antoniou et al., 2008; Lemmon et al., 2008) provide the intermediate (unbiased) cases.
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sistently estimate the heterogeneous adjustment speeds for firms facing differential adjustment costs,
under different financing regimes and different states of the economy. To study the cross-sectional
asymmetry in the SOA, we consider several firm-specific variables that may affect the adjustment costs,
namely growth opportunities, investment, firm size, earnings volatility, the Size–Age index (hereafter
SA, a measure of financial constraints proposed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010)), and deviations from
target leverage. To examine the time-series variation in the SOA, we compare the SOA estimated for
the pre-crisis period with that estimated for the crisis period. Overall, our approach is capable of test-
ing the validity of the dynamic trade-off theory because it explicitly allows for asymmetric and costly
capital structure adjustments.
Using a recent sample of US firms during 2002–2012, we provide the first evidence in the literature
of the negative impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the SOA. While we document strong and robust
evidence of the time-varying heterogeneity in the SOA, we observe weaker cross-sectional variation in
this speed. For the whole sample period, there is limited evidence of threshold effects and asymmetric
adjustment speeds conditional on the firm-specific variables proxying for financial constraints. In our
subperiod analysis, however, we document stronger cross-sectional heterogeneity in the SOA, which
is most pronounced in the pre-crisis years. Pre-crisis, we find that more constrained firms, including
those with high growth, with large investment, of small size, with volatile earnings, and with a high SA
index, move toward their target leverage more rapidly than their less constrained counterparts. These
results provide little support for the financial constraint argument, suggesting that firm-specific mea-
sures of constraints play a less important role than supply-side external factors, i.e., the credit shock
triggered by the crisis. Our analysis of the firm-specific characteristics reveals that constrained firms
have large financing deficits, which they offset by using external funds. Thus, these firms have higher
adjustment speeds possibly because of lower adjustment costs that can be shared with the transaction
costs of raising external finance (Faulkender et al., 2012). For the crisis period, the SOA only varies
cross-sectionally with the deviation from target leverage. Firms with large deviations attempt to revert
to their target leverage, albeit at slow rates, while those with small deviations make no such attempt.
Finally, comparing the pre-crisis and crisis results, we find that the negative effects of the crisis on
the adjustment speeds are also asymmetric: they seem more pronounced for firms facing more finan-
cial constraints. Overall, our results provide new evidence of both time-varying and cross-sectional
asymmetries in capital structure adjustments, which is broadly consistent with the trade-off theory.
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Our study paper is related to, and improves on, a few recent studies that have started to examine the
implications of costly adjustment on dynamic leverage rebalancing. Drobetz et al. (2006) investigate
the impact of various firm-specific variables on the SOA, although unlike our paper, the authors do not
explicitly account for the asymmetries in capital structure adjustments. More recently, some research
has explicitly allowed for cross-sectional heterogeneity in the SOA, conditional on a number of fac-
tors, namely (i) firms’ specific characteristics proxying for financial constraints (e.g., Dang et al., 2011;
Elsas and Florysiak, 2011), (ii) the magnitude of firms’ deviation from target leverage and/or their fi-
nancing gaps (e.g., Byoun, 2008), or (iii) firms’ cash flow realizations (e.g., Faulkender et al., 2012).
Unlike our paper, however, these studies generally adopt a simple approach based on dummy variables
or sample splitting using given thresholds (e.g., the medians), which involves a degree of arbitrariness
and is likely to suffer from a sample selection bias problem (Hansen, 2000). Simply put, these existing
studies may not provide accurate estimates of the heterogeneous adjustment speeds. We address this
crucial drawback by employing a threshold partial adjustment model in which the threshold is esti-
mated within the model rather than being imposed arbitrarily ex ante. Hence, our approach provides
consistent estimates of the (heterogeneous) SOA. In addition, by categorizing firms into different fi-
nancing regimes using the threshold estimates, we provide important insights into the characteristics
of firms that have differential adjustment costs and consequently take asymmetric adjustment paths.
Our study contributes to the literature examining the effects of macroeconomic conditions on cor-
porate capital structure (e.g., Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Covas and Den Haan, 2011; Erel et al., 2012).
In particular, our empirical work is related to a strand of research focusing on the effects of business
cycle variables on dynamic capital structure adjustments (Drobetz and Wanzenried, 2006; Cook and
Tang, 2010). We extend this research agenda by studying the impacts of the recent Global Financial
Crisis and the associated credit shock on the speed of leverage adjustment. In doing so, we provide
novel evidence of both cross-sectional and time-varying heterogeneity in the SOA. Our analysis also
contributes to a growing literature investigating the effects of the crisis on corporate financial policies
(Campello et al., 2010; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Duchin et al., 2010; Campello et al., 2011). We
document new evidence that the crisis does not only influence the leverage ratio, but also the speed of
leverage adjustment.
Finally, our paper is related to a recent study by Dang et al. (2012), who also employ dynamic panel
threshold models to examine asymmetric capital structure adjustments. We differ from this study in a
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number of important ways. First, in terms of methods, Dang et al. (2012) assume that both the SOA and
the long-run relationships between target leverage and its determining factors can be heterogeneous
under different financing regimes. However, we follow the conventional approach in the literature
(Byoun, 2008; Faulkender et al., 2012) and assume homogeneous long-run target relationships. Hence,
in line with most theoretical and empirical research in the literature, the focus of our paper is to identify
and compare the (heterogeneous) speeds with which firms adjust toward a common long-run target
leverage ratio (or a target range more generally), albeit under different regimes. Second, while Dang et
al. (2012) document some UK evidence of heterogeneous adjustment speeds for the period 1997–2003,
we provide new US evidence obtained using the dynamic threshold models for a more recent period
2002–2012. Third, and most importantly, we examine not only the cross-sectional heterogeneity in
the SOA, but also the time-varying asymmetry in this speed, especially the asymmetry caused by the
Global Financial Crisis.
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the linear, partial adjust-
ment model of leverage and then develop a two-regime threshold model, accounting for asymmetric
capital structure adjustments. Next, we discuss the potential determinants of the SOA to be employed
as transition variables under the proposed regime-switching framework. Here, we also discuss how
the credit shock triggered by the Global Financial Crisis gives rise to time-varying heterogeneity in the
SOA. In Section 3, we briefly describe the estimation and testing procedures. To preserve space, we
discuss our econometric methods in detail in a separate technical supplement (available upon request).
In Section 4, we report and discuss the empirical results. In Section 5, we provide some concluding
remarks.
2 Dynamic Capital Structure Adjustment Models
2.1 Linear and Threshold Partial Adjustment Models of Leverage
2.1.1 Linear Partial Adjustment Model
To test the dynamic trade-off theory’s prediction that firms adjust toward target leverage in the long-run,
extant empirical research has used the following partial adjustment model of leverage (e.g., Flannery
and Rangan, 2006):
∆dit = λ (d∗it−dit−1)+ vit , (1)
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where dit is the actual leverage ratio and d∗it is the target leverage ratio;2 vit is an error component such
that vit = µi + eit , where µi is the (unobserved) firm fixed effects which capture unique industry- and
firm-specific characteristics. eit is the idiosyncratic error term with zero mean and constant variance.
λ is the SOA, which varies between 0 and 1 due to the presence of positive adjustment costs. The
magnitude of the SOA is the key subject of empirical capital structure studies because it indicates how
fast firms move toward their target leverage. Thus, it sheds light on the question of whether firms
follow the trade-off theory’s prediction. In the empirical work below, we first estimate this model
before focusing on the threshold partial adjustment model.
Note that in (1), target leverage is unobserved. However, this target ratio can be proxied by a
function of firm-specific characteristics, as follows:
dit = d∗it +uit = β
′xit +uit , (2)
where xit is a k× 1 vector of the determinants, β is a vector of the corresponding coefficients, and
uit is the error term with zero mean and constant variance. Based on previous research (e.g., Flan-
nery and Rangan, 2006; Byoun, 2008), we include in this target leverage model the most widely-used
determinants of leverage, namely profitability, growth opportunities (the market-to-book ratio), depre-
ciation, firm size, tangibility, R&D expenses and the R&D dummy variable, and the industry median
of leverage.3
Based on (1) and (2), we employ a two-stage procedure typically used in the literature to estimate
the SOA (e.g., Fama and French, 2002; Byoun, 2008; Faulkender et al., 2012). First, we regress actual
leverage on the determinants in (2) and obtain the fitted values as proxies for target leverage, dˆ∗it = βˆ
′
xit ,
where βˆ is the consistent estimate of β . Second, given the (estimated) target leverage, dˆ∗it , we estimate
the SOA, λ , in (1). Note that an alternative approach is to substitute (2) into (1), thus obtaining the
following model that can be estimated in one stage (e.g., Ozkan, 2001; Flannery and Rangan, 2006):
dit = φdit−1+ γ ′xit + vit , (3)
where φ = 1−λ and γ = λβ . In one-stage estimation, the SOA and target leverage relationships are
2Following previous research (Fama and French, 2002; Chang and Dasgupta, 2009), we measure leverage by the book
leverage ratio.
3To avoid a potential endogeneity problem, in our empirical work we include the lagged values of these variables.
7
estimated jointly such that λˆ = 1− φˆ and βˆ = γˆ/(1− φˆ). In estimating the linear, partial adjustment
model (1), we consider both the one- and two-stage estimation approaches.
2.1.2 Dynamic Threshold Partial Adjustment Model
Using the linear, partial adjustment model (1) assumes symmetry in capital structure adjustment such
that the speed with which firms adjust toward target leverage is homogeneous. However, this assump-
tion is questionable because firms have different degrees of financial constraints and thus do not adjust
in the same manner. As mentioned, firms only adjust their capital structures when the costs of adjust-
ment are more than offset by the benefits of being close to target leverage (Fischer et al., 1989). It
follows that firms with high levels of financial constraints may face higher adjustment costs, resulting
in potentially slower adjustment. In contrast, firms with good access to the external capital markets
should have the capability to adjust their capital structures quickly. In addition, firms may take different
adjustment paths according to the position of their actual leverage relative to target leverage. Assum-
ing a fixed adjustment cost function, firms should adjust their capital structures more frequently at
the lower or upper thresholds of the target leverage range. The larger the deviation from the target, the
faster the SOA. However, when firms have a proportional adjustment cost function (Leary and Roberts,
2005), an opposite prediction can be reached. In this case, firms with actual leverage deviating from
target leverage may find it costly to revert to the target, so that their adjustment is small in magnitude
and takes place more slowly.
The above arguments simply suggest that firms’ adjustment speeds should be different, according
to their degrees of financial constraints, or their positions relative to target leverage (i.e., target leverage
deviation). To account for such (cross-sectional) asymmetry in capital structure adjustment, we employ
the following threshold partial adjustment model:
∆dit = λ1 (d∗it−dit−1)1(qit≤c)+λ2 (d∗it−dit−1)1(qit>c)+ vit , vit = µi+ eit , (4)
where 1(·) is an indicator function used to divide firms into two financing regimes, conditional on the
(regime-switching) transition variable, qit , which captures differences in firms’ adjustment costs (see
Section 2.2 for detailed discussions of several candidates for this variable). Firms are categorized into
the low regime if qit ≤ c and into the high regime if qit > c,4 and c is the threshold parameter that will
4It is in theory straightforward to develop threshold models with multiple regimes, although, practically, the larger the
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be estimated within the model rather than being imposed ex ante.5
Model (4) improves on the linear, partial adjustment model, (1), in one crucial aspect: it explicitly
allows for (cross-sectional) asymmetry in capital structure adjustment, and more specifically, hetero-
geneity in the SOA for firms under two different financing regimes. Further, our modeling has an
important advantage over the typical approach used in recent research to study asymmetric adjust-
ment based on sample-splitting or dummy variables (e.g., Byoun, 2008). While the sample-splitting
or dummy variable approach selects regimes in an ad-hoc and arbitrary manner ex ante (e.g., the me-
dian or quartiles), our model allows the threshold parameter to be estimated within the model (Hansen,
2000). Thus, our approach completely avoids any arbitrariness in choosing threshold values that may
lead to nontrivial estimation biases in the SOA and inference complexities in testing for the threshold
effects, problems that may affect the conclusions drawn.
2.2 Regime-switching Variables and Determinants of the Speed of Adjustment
In this subsection, we discuss several candidates for the (regime-switching) transition variable, qit , in
the threshold dynamic panel model of leverage, (4).
2.2.1 Single Firm-specific Variables
Growth Opportunities. The effect of growth opportunities on the SOA is ambiguous. Firms having
high growth prospects tend to be young, with limited profitability, and retained earnings, so that they
must rely mainly on external funds to finance their investments. Frequent visits to the external capital
markets mean that the costs of leverage adjustment are relatively smaller as they can be shared with
the costs of issuing securities (Faulkender et al., 2012). More importantly, through external financing
activities, high-growth firms can choose an appropriate mix of debt and equity to quickly close out any
deviations from their target leverage (Drobetz et al., 2006; Dang et al., 2012). This argument suggests
that growth opportunities and the SOA have a positive relation. However, a counter-argument can be
made. Firms with limited growth options tend to operate in mature industries and face a low cost of
capital. Accordingly, these firms may adjust their capital structures more rapidly than their high-growth
number of regimes, the heavier the computational burden, and the more complex the inference. In unreported experiments,
we found (statistically) insignificant results in favor of three over two regimes.
5Recent empirical research in corporate finance has employed an alternative approach based on the Maddala and Nelson
(1994) endogenous switching model. See, for example, Almeida and Campello (2007) and Hanousek and Shamshur (2011).
However, this approach is most applicable to static panel data models and has not yet been extended to the general case of
dynamic models, such as the partial adjustment model considered in our study.
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counterparts. Moreover, low-growth firms with large free cash flows tend to adopt a high-leverage
policy to alleviate overinvestment problems (Jensen, 1986); yet high leverage with potentially high
financial distress costs may provide these firms with strong incentives to adjust their capital structures,
especially when they are over-levered. These arguments predict that growth opportunities and the SOA
are inversely related.
Firm Size. Large firms generally have better access to external sources of financing than small firms
because they face lower degrees of asymmetric information and agency problems (Drobetz et al., 2006).
They also tend to be more mature with higher asset tangibility and profitability, and so face lower
leverage adjustment costs. These arguments suggest that firm size and the SOA are positively related.
However, larger firms may use more public debt that is costly to adjust (Flannery and Rangan, 2006).
Further, they may are under less pressure to attain target leverage thanks to lower financial distress
costs, less cash flow volatility, and fewer debt covenants (Dang et al., 2012). Put differently, large firms
may have less incentive to adjust their capital structures due to lower opportunity costs of deviating
from the optimal levels (Elsas and Florysiak, 2011). Hence, an alternative prediction is that large firms
have a slower SOA than small firms.
Investment. Firms with large capital expenditure may need to raise funds externally, which provides
them with an opportunity to adjust their capital structures appropriately as the adjustment costs can
be shared with the costs of external financing (Faulkender et al., 2012). The implication follows that
investment and the SOA are positively related. However, if capital spending is mostly funded by inter-
nally generated funds (e.g., Myers, 1984), it may reduce the retained earnings available for (internal)
leverage adjustment (e.g., share repurchases or debt retirements). This alternative argument suggests a
negative impact of investment on the SOA.
Earnings Volatility. Firms with volatile earnings typically face borrowing constraints due to the risk
of them not generating sufficient earnings to meet debt commitments (Antoniou et al., 2008). As these
firms have limited access to the external capital markets, they are likely to make slower adjustment
toward target leverage (Dang et al., 2012). Hence, we expect earnings volatility and the SOA to be
inversely related.
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2.2.2 Composite Measures of Financial Constraints and Target Leverage Deviations
The SA index. One of our main arguments has been that financially constrained firms, such as small
and high-growth firms and those with volatile earnings, are likely to adjust their capital structures more
slowly than their unconstrained counterparts.6 However, the single firm characteristics discussed above
only provide indirect and incomplete measures of financial constraints. To address this limitation, we
consider a direct, composite measure of external financial constraints.7 Following Hadlock and Pierce
(2010), we use the SA index, a linear combination of firm size and age.8 Firms with low SA scores are
less financially constrained than those with high scores. We thus expect the former firms to have lower
adjustment speeds than the latter firms. In short, the SOA should be inversely related to the SA index.
Deviations from Target Leverage. Dynamic trade-off models suggest that a firm does not always
adjust its capital structure. The firm may allow its leverage to deviate from a target as long as the costs
of adjustment outweigh the opportunity costs of deviation (Fischer et al., 1989; Leland, 1994). If fixed
costs (e.g., listing, registration, and underwriting fees) are a major component of the adjustment costs,
the larger the deviation, the greater the incentive for the firm to make the adjustment. There will be
some lower or upper bounds where the benefits of operating at target leverage outweigh the fixed costs
of adjustment. At those restructuring thresholds, capital structure adjustment takes place more quickly,
implying a positive relationship between the (absolute) target leverage deviation and the SOA.
However, if adjustment costs are an increasing function of the target leverage deviation, i.e., a
proportional cost function (Leary and Roberts, 2005), we may reach a conflicting prediction.9 A firm
with a large deviation from its target leverage may find it costly to revert to such a target, meaning any
adjustment tends to be small in magnitude. Alternatively, when adjustment costs become prohibitively
high, firms tend to avoid external adjustment (via security issues), and rely more on internal adjustment
(via security repurchases/retirements), which is limited in scope and magnitude (Drobetz et al., 2006).
6Recently, Campbell et al. (2012) show that (internal) financing constraints do increase the cost of debt and equity.
7We thank the reviewer for this suggestion.
8Hadlock and Pierce (2010) show that the SA index is a more appropriate measure of financial constraints than just firm
size and alternative composite measures, such as the KZ index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Lamont et al., 2001) and the
WW index (Whited and Wu, 2006). In (unreported) analysis, we have considered the KZ and WW indices and obtained
mixed results. Similarly, we have obtained unsatisfactory results for other commonly used single measures of constraints,
including the dividend payout ratio and asset tangibility.
9According to Lee et al. (1996), the average total direct costs of seasoned equity offerings are 7.7% of the proceeds,
while those of straight debt issues are 2.2%. Economies of scale exist as these costs seem to be negatively related to the
total proceeds. However, the larger the size of the security issue, the smaller the economies of scale. For example, the
economies of scale are mainly exhausted for straight debt issues with total proceeds exceeding $40 million. Overall, there
is moderate evidence that the adjustment costs are proportional.
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Further, firms typically refrain from using all internal funds for adjustment purposes because they wish
to preserve their financial flexibility. These arguments point to a negative relationship between the
magnitude of target leverage deviation and the SOA.
We use two measures of deviations from target leverage, the absolute deviation level and the ab-
solute deviation ratio. The deviation ratio has an important qualitative advantage over the deviation
level. For the purpose of illustration, suppose that the absolute deviation is 20% for two firms A and B,
whose target leverage ratios are equal to 25% and 50%, respectively. Estimating the threshold model
using the absolute deviation of 20% as the transition variable does not recognize the fact that firm A
is deviating considerably from the target leverage with a deviation ratio of 80%, whereas firm B is
deviating moderately with a deviation ratio of 40%. The SOA may differ for these two firms, even with
the same absolute deviation.
2.3 The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the Speed of Adjustment
Our discussion in the previous subsection shows how the SOA can vary cross-sectionally with several
firm-specific characteristics and their linear combinations, proxying for the degrees of financial con-
straints and costs of leverage adjustment. However, the SOA may also vary over time because capital
structure adjustment can be affected by the stage of the business cycle, especially by an exogenous
credit shock triggered by the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009.10 There are several arguments
as to why macroeconomic conditions influence corporate capital structure decisions. First, in the lit-
erature on monetary transmission, the balance sheet channel view argues that corporate leverage is
pro-cyclical (e.g., Bernake and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). The underlying argument is
that a firm tends to borrow less during an economic downturn, for the value of its collateral declines,
reducing its debt capacity; see also Bernanke and Gertler (1995) for a review. However, the effect of
the business cycle variables on a firm’s leverage increases with its degree of financial constraint. A
constrained firm has greater difficulty borrowing in bad states because of a much larger premium on
external funds (e.g., Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993). Empirical research generally shows that corporate
capital structure varies with macroeconomic conditions. However, while earlier evidence suggests that
leverage is counter-cyclical (e.g., Korajczyk and Levy, 2003), recent evidence shows that, consistent
with the balance sheet channel view, debt issues are pro-cyclical, especially for firms facing financial
10We thank the reviewer for encouraging us to follow this line of inquiry.
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constrains and having low credit ratings (Covas and Den Haan, 2011; Erel et al., 2012).
Second, and more importantly, macroeconomic variables affect not only a firm’s leverage ratio
but also its adjustment toward target leverage (e.g., Drobetz and Wanzenried, 2006; Hackbarth et al.,
2006; Cook and Tang, 2010). Hackbarth et al. (2006) show theoretically that firms rebalance their
leverage ratios more frequently in economic expansions than in economic recessions. The thresholds
for leverage adjustments are higher in recessions because they increase with (proportional) adjustment
costs that rise with adverse macroeconomic conditions. Empirically, Cook and Tang (2010) find that
between 1977 and 2006, firms adjust toward target leverage faster in good states of the economy when
they have access to a greater supply of credits and face lower adjustment costs.
To examine the effects of macroeconomic conditions on capital structure adjustments, we use a
negative (exogenous) shock to the supply of credits caused by the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–
2009. The crisis, which began in August 2007 as a consequence of subprime mortgage defaults in the
US, and the resulting economic recession (from December 2007 to June 2009) had severe effects on
financial institutions and non-financial companies. Several recent studies document significant adverse
effects of the crisis on corporate financial policies, including a substantially lower supply or higher
costs of external finance, a considerable decline in bank borrowings (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010),
and a significant cutback in investments (Campello et al., 2010; Duchin et al., 2010; Campello et al.,
2011). Based on the above theoretical predictions and recent empirical evidence, we hypothesize that
firms face higher leverage adjustment costs during the crisis and, as a result, move toward their target
leverage at slower rates. Simply put, the Global Financial Crisis has a negative impact on the SOA.
Further, such an impact is likely to be greater for firms that are already financially constrained and,
thus, face even more limited access to external finance.
3 Methods
In this section, we combine three branches of literature, namely (linear) dynamic panel data models
(Alvarez and Arellano, 2003), threshold models in nonlinear time series analysis (Chan, 1993; Hansen,
2000), and threshold models in static panels (Hansen, 1999), to develop estimation and testing proce-
dures for the threshold dynamic panel data model, (4). Next, we propose two approaches to investigate
the effects of the global financial crisis on the adjustment speeds.
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3.1 Estimating the Threshold Partial Adjustment Model
As in the linear case described in Subsection 2.1, we now adopt the two-stage procedure to estimate
the threshold partial adjustment model, (4).11 In the first stage, we estimate (2) to obtain the long-run
target leverage dˆ∗it = βˆ
′
xit . In the second, we estimate the heterogeneous adjustment speeds, λ1 and λ2
corresponding to two financing regimes, in (4):
∆dit = λ1
(
dˆ∗it−dit−1
)
1(qit≤c)+λ2
(
dˆ∗it−dit−1
)
1(qit>c)+µi+ eit , i = 1, . . . ,N; t = 2, . . . ,T, (5)
which can be compactly written as:
∆dit = λ1dev1it (c)+λ2dev2it (c)+µi+ eit , (6)
where dev1it (c) =
(
dˆ∗it−dit−1
)
1(qit≤c) and dev2it (c) =
(
dˆ∗it−dit−1
)
1(qit>c) are the deviations from
target leverage for firms in the low and high regimes, respectively, and the µ ′i s are the unobserved firm
fixed effects. Note that to mitigate endogeneity concerns, we use the first lagged values of the transition
variables.
In estimating λ1 and λ2 in (5), the pooled OLS estimator (hereafter POLS) is biased downwards
because the two regressors, dev1it (c) and dev2it (c), are correlated with the fixed effects µi. Even the
fixed effects (hereafter FE) estimator, which wipes out the individual effects, µi, from the model, is
biased upwards for fixed T (Nickell, 1981).
To avoid this problem, we consider the first-difference transformation of (6):
∆2dit = λ1∆dev1it (c)+λ2∆dev2it (c)+∆eit , i = 1, ...,N; t = 3, ...,T, (7)
which is free of the unobserved fixed effects, µi. However, applying the POLS estimator to this first-
11Here we follow conventional theoretical and empirical research in the literature (Fischer et al., 1989; Byoun, 2008;
Faulkender et al., 2012), and assume that the long-run target leverage relationships are homogeneous across regimes. Hence,
our focus is to compare the (heterogeneous) speeds with which firms adjust toward common long-run target leverage ratios.
An alternative way to develop the threshold partial adjustment model of leverage is to substitute (2) into (5) to yield:
dit =
(
φ1dit−1+ γ ′1xit
)
1(qit≤c)+
(
φ2dit−1+ γ ′2xit
)
1(qit>c)+µi+ eit .
Dang et al. (2012) consider this one-stage estimation approach and allow both the SOA and the long-run target leverage
relationships to be heterogeneous under different regimes. Note, however, that it is much more complex to estimate this
model under the assumption of common target leverage, which imposes the following nonlinear restrictions: β 1 = β 2
where β j =−γ j/φ j, j = 1,2.
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difference model still produces biased estimates of the SOA because ∆dev1it (c) and ∆dev2it (c) are
correlated with ∆eit via the correlation between di,t−1 and ei,t−1. To address this crucial issue, we
follow the literature and consider using instrumental variable (henceforth IV) and GMM estimators.
Specifically, we need to find instruments for ∆dev1it (c) and ∆dev2it (c) in (7) that satisfy the orthogonal
condition with ∆eit . Two possible candidates are dev1i,t−1 (c) and dev2i,t−1 (c), as suggested by Ander-
son and Hsiao (1982); we refer to this method AH-IV. Although the AH-IV estimator is consistent, it
lacks efficiency.
To improve the efficiency of the estimates, we extend Arellano and Bond’s (1998) linear GMM esti-
mator and and consider dev1i,t−1 (c) and dev2i,t−1 (c), where dev1,it−1 (c) =
(
dˆ∗i,t−1−dit−2
)
1(qit≤c) and
dev2i,t−1 (c) =
(
dˆ∗i,t−1−di,t−2
)
1(qit>c), and their deeper lagged values as instruments for ∆dev1it (c)
and ∆dev2it (c), where ∆dev1it (c) =
(
∆dˆ∗it−∆di,t−1
)
1(qit≤c) and ∆dev2it (c) =
(
∆dˆ∗it−∆di,t−1
)
1(qit>c)
in (7).12 We are then able to construct the matrix of the full GMM instruments, denoted W(c), and
derive the one- and two-step GMM estimators, λˆ s (c), with s = GMM1,GMM2, for a given threshold,
c. We provide a detailed derivation of these GMM estimators in a separate technical supplement.
Next, we estimate the threshold parameter, c, consistently by using a grid search over the support
of the transition variable, qit , that minimizes a generalized distance measure, such that:
cˆ = argmin
c∈C
Q(c) . (8)
where C is the grid set and Q(c) is the generalized distance measure, given by:
Q(c) =
{
1
N
W(c)′∆eˆ(c)
}′{ 1
N
VˆGMMs (c)
}−1{ 1
N
W(c)′∆eˆ(c)
}
, s = 1,2, (9)
where ∆eˆ(c) = ∆2d−∆dev(c) λˆ s (c), W(c) is the matrix of the GMM instruments, and VˆGMMs (c) is
the estimated covariance matrix in the s-step GMM regression, where s = 1,2. Note that because the
model is linear in λ for each c, our grid search algorithm should produce a consistent estimate of the
threshold value, cˆ. For practical reasons, such as to avoid the effects of extreme values, our grid set, C ,
is restricted between the 15th and 85th percentiles of the transition variable. Chan (1993) shows under
the assumption of exogenous transition variables that the threshold estimate, cˆ, is super-consistent,
though its asymptotic distribution is complex and depends on nuisance parameters. However, this
12We use the first lagged values dev1i,t−1 (c) and dev2i,t−1 (c) as instruments because they are correlated to the indepen-
dent variables but not included in the dynamic model (7), and not correlated to the error term in first differences, ∆eit .
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finding is not useful for inference in practice. Hence, we follow Hansen (1999, 2000), and construct
the confidence interval for cˆ by forming the non-rejection region using the LR statistic for the null
hypothesis, H0 : c = c0.
Finally, it is important to assess the (potential) impact of dˆ∗it , the estimated regressor of d∗it from (2),
on the GMM estimators of the SOA, λ in (6). It is well established in the econometrics literature that
λˆ , the two-stage estimator of λ , will be asymptotically efficient, and no asymptotic efficiency gains are
available by switching to a full MLE of (2) and (5) simultaneously, though the least-square estimator
of the variance of λˆ is potentially inconsistent (e.g., Pagan, 1984). However, for any given threshold
parameter, c, and for large N, the two-step GMM estimator is consistent and asymptotically normally
distributed with the covariance matrices consistently estimated (see Newey, 1984; Hall, 2005, and also
the technical supplement). Hence, in our empirical analysis, we adopt the two-step GMM estimator to
take advantage of its superior efficiency and robustness.13
3.2 Testing for Threshold Effects
We briefly outline our procedure to test the null hypothesis of no threshold effect (homogeneous SOA)
in (4) against the alternative hypothesis of a threshold effect (heterogeneous SOA). Formally, we set
the null hypothesis as:
H0 : Rλ = 0, (10)
where R = (1,−1) and λ = (λ1,λ2). We then consider the following Wald statistic:
W (cˆ) =
{
Rλˆ (cˆ)
}′{
RV̂ar
(
λˆ (cˆ)
)
R′
}−1{
Rλˆ (cˆ)
}
, (11)
where λˆ (cˆ) is the GMM estimator. It is straightforward to evaluate the Wald statistic for each c using
the (asymptotic) variance estimates. See our supplement for more details. However, inference is non-
standard due to the well-established problem that the (nuisance) threshold parameter, c, is not identified
under the null (Davies, 1987; Andrews and Ploberger, 1994, 1996; Hansen, 1996). To overcome this
13The GMM estimator and the associated bootstrap-based testing procedure, as discussed in the next subsection, are
implemented using Stata codes based on xtabond2 (Roodman, 2009). Based on Blundell and Bond’s (1998) system GMM
(SYSGMM) for (non-threshold) dynamic panels, we have also developed the SYSGMM estimator for the threshold (non-
linear) case (the detailed derivation of which is available upon request). However, we do not use this method in our
empirical work below because the validity of the SYSGMM instruments is strongly rejected at the 1% level for all cases
considered. The over-fitting bias problem seems to be more serious in dynamic panel threshold models.
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problem, we follow Hansen (1996, 1999) and obtain a valid asymptotic p-value of the statistic using
a bootstrap technique. We describe this bootstrap-based testing procedure in detail in our technical
supplement. We have also conducted Monte Carlo simulation exercises to investigate the performance
of the GMM estimators and inferences in two-stage estimation, especially in the presence of generated
regressors. The simulation results reported in our supplement show that the two-step GMM estimator is
reasonably precise. Moreover, the bootstrap-based Wald test for threshold effects has almost negligible
size distortion, and sufficiently high power.
3.3 Examining the Impact of the Global Financial Crisis
To examine the effects of the Global Financial Crisis on the SOA, we adopt two approaches. First, we
add a dummy variable that proxies for the effects of the crisis to the linear partial adjustment model
(1):
∆dit = (λ +λFCDt)devit + vit , (12)
where the dummy variable, Dt , takes the value of 1 if the year in question is a crisis year (between 2007
and 2009), and 0 otherwise. The regressor, devit =d∗it−dit−1, is the deviation from target leverage. The
SOA is equal to λ in the noncrisis years and λ+λFC in the crisis years (2007–2009). According to our
hypothesis, we expect a negative impact of the crisis on the SOA, i.e., λFC < 0.
A drawback of the dummy-variable approach is that it implicitly assumes homogeneity in the long-
run relationships between target leverage and its determinants, regardless of the period under investi-
gation (crisis versus noncrisis). Hence, we next employ an alternative approach in which we allow the
long-run target leverage relationships to change during the crisis period. Specifically, we examine two
subperiods, a pre-crisis period between 2002 and 2006 and a crisis period between 2006 and 2010.14
For each subperiod, we estimate the linear partial adjustment model (1) and test whether the SOA
declines during the crisis period.
Note that the above sample-splitting analysis only allows for time-varying heterogeneity in the
SOA, the heterogeneity caused by the crisis. To examine a more realistic scenario under which the
SOA also varies with the (regime-switching) transition variables, as discussed in Subsection 3.2, we
14According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), there was an economic recession between March
and November 2001. We thus consider the pre-crisis period from 2002 in order to avoid the impact of this economic
downturn.
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employ the threshold model (5) for each subperiod. That is, we estimate the threshold and the SOA
for each regime-switching variable, for the pre-crisis and crisis periods, respectively. Due to the short
length of our sample period and the low frequency of the (annual) data, we impose the time-series
thresholds rather than estimating them. The main aim of this analysis is to determine whether there
exists cross-sectional heterogeneity in the SOA conditional on the regime-switching variables, even
after accounting for the effects of the Global Financial Crisis.
A potential limitation of our subperiod analysis is that our crisis period (2006–2010) covers two
non-crisis years 2006 and 2010, of which the year 2006 is also overlapping with the pre-crisis period
(2002–2006). However, it is not possible to restrict the crisis period to 2007–2009, as in the dummy-
variable approach above, because the GMM regressions for each subperiod require at least five firm-
year observations (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Note that including two non-crisis years in the crisis
period may affect the accuracy of the SOA estimates. To address this limitation and the arbitrariness in
specifying subperiods, we conduct a rolling-regression analysis in which we estimate both the linear
and threshold, partial adjustment models (1) and (5), using a series of five-year subsamples. The first
subsample is 2002–2006 and the last subsample is 2008–2012, with a rolling window of one year.
This analysis allows us to examine the evolution of the (heterogeneous) SOA over the sample period
2002–2012.
4 Data and Empirical Results
4.1 Data and Sample Selection
We collect annual financial and accounting data for US publicly listed firms from the Compustat
database for the period 2002–2012. Our sample period is reasonable because it covers the Global
Financial Crisis and so enables us to examine the effects of the crisis on capital structure adjustment.
As mentioned above, our sample starts from 2002 so as to avoid the collapse of the dot-com bubble
(1999–2000) and the economic recession (2001). Our relatively short sample length (11 years in total)
also helps to reduce heavy computational burden required in the grid search for the threshold value
and, in particular, the bootstrap-based threshold test. We apply the following standard restrictions on
our data (Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Byoun, 2008). First, we remove financial firms (SIC codes
6000–6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900–4999) because they are subject to different accounting con-
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siderations. Second, we remove firms that have fewer than five years of observations so that we can
use the GMM estimators that require the use of lagged instruments (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Third,
we also remove observations that have missing data. Finally, we winsorize all variables at the 1st and
99th percentiles to mitigate the impact of extreme outliers (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). Our sample
comprises 6,232 companies and 51,894 firm-year observations. In Table 1, we provide the summary
statistics for the variables of interest.
Table 1 about here
4.2 Regression Results for the Linear Partial Adjustment Model
Table 2 reports the regression results for the static model of target leverage (2) and the (linear) dynamic
model of leverage adjustment (3). The static model is estimated with the POLS and FE estimators. The
partial adjustment model is estimated with two dynamic panel data methods, the AH-IV and GMM
estimators.15 We include time dummies in our dynamic model (3) to control for changes in common
macroeconomic conditions that affect corporate capital structures (e.g., Flannery and Rangan, 2006).
We report the AR(2) and Sargan test statistics to assess the validity of the instruments used in the
dynamic models.
Table 2 about here
The results for the target leverage model (2) reported in columns (1) and (2) show that profitability
has a significantly negative effect on target leverage, which is consistent with both the pecking order
theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984) and dynamic trade-off models (e.g., Strebulaev, 2007),
as well as previous empirical evidence (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Growth
opportunities and target leverage have a positive relation, which is in line with the pecking order view
(e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2007). This finding is, however, inconsistent with the agency arguments that
high-growth (low-growth) firms use less (more) leverage to alleviate underinvestment (overinvestment)
incentives (Myers, 1977; Jensen, 1986). Depreciation has a significantly positive effect on target lever-
age, which is inconsistent with the view that non-debt tax shields (such as depreciation) can substitute
for debt tax shields (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). However, this finding may be driven by the corre-
lation between depreciation and tangibility (fixed assets), which has a strong positive impact on target
15Note that the GMM estimator used here is for the linear case, as opposed to the estimator for the more general, non-
linear case developed in Subsection 3.1 above.
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leverage (Mackie-Mason, 1990). Indeed, the coefficient on tangibility is significantly positive, sup-
porting the argument that tangible assets can be used as a collateral to avoid the asset substitution
problem (e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2007). The coefficients on R&D expenses and its dummy variable are
either insignificant or significant with an unexpected sign. Finally, consistent with our conjecture, the
industry median leverage ratio has a positive effect on target leverage. Overall, the regression results,
in particular those obtained with POLS, are reasonable.
In columns (3) and (4), which report the results for the linear partial adjustment model (3), the
(implied) SOA estimated with the AH-IV and GMM estimators is 31% and 29%, respectively. These
results suggest that US firms adjust their capital structures with moderate speeds: they close out ap-
proximately 30% of their deviations from target leverage per year.16 Our estimates are consistent with
recent estimates of the SOA reported in the literature (Lemmon et al., 2008) and provide moderate
support for the dynamic trade-off theory.
We next estimate the partial adjustment model using the two-stage procedure based on (1) and (2).
In Table 3, we report the results obtained using four alternative estimators, including two traditional,
yet biased methods for dynamic panels (i.e., POLS and FE) and two advanced and unbiased methods
(i.e., AH-IV and GMM).17The POLS and FE estimates of the SOA are 18% and 53%, respectively,
which are clearly biased downwardly and upwardly, as expected. Turning to the consistent estimates
obtained with AH-IV and GMM, the SOA is 33% and 31%, respectively. These results are in line
with the one-stage estimation results and again show that US firms, on average, adjust toward target
leverage at moderate rates.18 Overall, our one-stage and two-stage results provide robust evidence for
the trade-off theory.
Table 3 about here
The results discussed so far assume that firms adjust their capital structures in a symmetric manner
16Using the concept of “half life”, these estimates indicate that it takes 1.94 years for deviations from target leverage to
be halved.
17To compute the target leverage ratio used in the second stage, we employ the POLS estimates reported in column (1) of
Table 2. We choose the POLS model over the FE model because the POLS results seem to be more appropriate than the FE
results. Specifically, in the FE model, growth opportunities, firm size, and the industry median leverage ratio, three of the
five most important determinants of target leverage (Frank and Goyal, 2009), are only weakly significant. The FE regression
also has a lower (adjusted) R-squared than the POLS regression (0.11 versus 0.17). Moreover, in subsequent analysis, we
find that the FE regression results for the pre-crisis and crisis periods are even more implausible with many insignificant
coefficients; see Table A.2 in the supplement. Hence, although recent research suggests estimating target leverage with the
firm fixed effects (Hovakimian and Li, 2011), we are unable to follow this approach due to the unsatisfactory FE results.
18In the GMM regression, the validity of the instruments used is questionable because the Sargan test is rejected (though
the AR(2) test is not rejected). Thus, the AH-IV estimate seems more reliable than the GMM estimate.
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and at a homogeneous rate. We now turn to discuss the empirical results obtained from the proposed
dynamic panel threshold model of leverage, (6).
4.3 Regression Results for the Threshold Partial Adjustment Model
Tables 4 and 5 report the regression results for the threshold partial adjustment model, (5). Specifically,
Table 4 contains the results for four single firm-specific transition variables, namely growth opportu-
nities, investment, firm size, and earnings volatility. Table 5 presents the results for three (composite)
indices, proxying for financial constraints and deviations from target leverage. Panel A of each table
reports the SOA estimates obtained using the two-step GMM estimator for the low and high regimes,
where in the low (high) regime, the value of the transition variable is less than (greater than) the es-
timated threshold value. The panel also contains information about the threshold value estimates (in
value and in percentage) and their 99% confidence intervals.19 Panel B summarizes the most relevant
characteristics of firms that are categorized into the low and high regimes. We use the t-test to ascertain
whether these characteristics are statistically different from each other.
4.3.1 Results for Single Firm-Specific Variables
The results in Panel A of Table 4 suggest that firms with higher growth opportunities, larger capital
expenditure, smaller sizes, and more volatile earnings tend to have higher adjustment speeds than those
with the opposite characteristics. However, the differences in the SOA estimates are fairly small in
magnitude, varying from 2.5% to 7.2%. More importantly, they are only significant for two transition
variables, investment and earnings volatility, where the threshold (Wald) test under the null of no
threshold effect is rejected at 1% and 5%, respectively. In columns (1)–(2), firms with large investment
adjust at a rate of 36% per year, while those with small investment adjust at a rate of 30% per year.
The difference of 6% in the SOA is moderate in magnitude but is statistically significant. Our finding
does not support the financial constraint view that firms with large investment, potentially funded
by retained earnings, may face internal financial constraints, thus having difficulty making (internal)
capital structure adjustment. However, it is in line with the argument that firms with large capital
expenditure have greater opportunities to choose an appropriate mix of new debt and equity, especially
19In unreported analysis, we have also considered the AH-IV estimator. However, for brevity, we only focus on the
GMM estimator here. Although both estimation methods are consistent, the GMM estimator is more efficient when the
instruments are valid (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and, as mentioned in the previous section, produces a valid procedure for
testing the threshold effect.
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when their investment is financed externally. These firms can adjust their capital structures faster
as they face potentially lower adjustment costs that can be shared with the costs of external funds
(Faulkender et al., 2012).20 Turning to Panel B, we find that, consistent with this cost-sharing argument,
firms with large capital spending have substantial cash flows and financing deficits, which they offset
through external financing, especially equity issues. Further, although these firms have relatively lower
leverage and are under-levered, they have significantly larger deviations from target leverage.21 The
latter finding is in line with our prediction that firms deviating considerably from their target leverage
have stronger incentives to adjust their capital structures.
Table 4 about here
In column (7)–(8), firms with more volatile earnings adjust toward target leverage significantly
more quickly than those with less volatile earnings. Specifically, the former firms have a SOA of 34%,
while the latter have a lower SOA of 27%. This finding is surprising because firms with high earnings
volatility tend to face borrowing constraints and have less scope for capital structure adjustment. Em-
pirically, it is inconsistent with recent evidence of the negative relationship between earnings volatility
and the SOA (Dang et al., 2012). An inspection of the firm-specific characteristics in Panel B suggests
that firms with volatile earnings have significantly lower leverage, as expected. However, they have
larger target leverage deviations, hence stronger incentives to adjust their capital structures. This find-
ing is in line with dynamic capital structure adjustment in the presence of a fixed cost function. Finally,
these firms rely heavily on external funds (mainly equity issues) to offset their large financing deficits,
which, as argued above, provides them with greater opportunities to find an appropriate mix of debt
and equity.
4.3.2 Results for Composite Measures of Financial Constraints and Target Leverage Deviations
Turning to Table 5, the results regarding three composite transition variables, namely the SA index
and the absolute target leverage deviation (in both levels and ratios) are mixed. Firms with low SA
scores and small (absolute) deviations tend to have smaller adjustment speeds than those with the
opposite characteristics. However, we only find evidence of a threshold effect when using the absolute
20Although this argument too applies to firms with high growth options that require external financing, in column (1),
we find no evidence of a statistically higher SOA for such firms.
21A firm’s deviation from target leverage is the difference between its observed leverage and target leverage where the
target leverage is estimated using the POLS results in column (1) of Table 2. A positive (negative) deviation suggests that
the firm is over-levered (under-levered) relative to its target leverage.
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deviation ratio as the transition variable. Specifically, in columns (5)–(6), firms with a larger deviation
ratio have a SOA of 36%, while those with a small deviation ratio have a lower SOA of 31%. This
finding is consistent with dynamic leverage rebalancing in the presence of a proportional adjustment
cost function. A firm deviating from its target leverage may find it costly to revert to the target so
adjustment tends to be small in magnitude, implying a slower SOA. It is, however, inconsistent with
the observations above that firms with a higher SOA tend to have larger target leverage deviations. We
return to this puzzling finding in the subperiod analysis in Subsection 4.4.2.
Table 5 about here
Overall, our results for the full sample provide weak and mixed evidence of cross-sectional het-
erogeneity in the SOA. Of the seven transition variables considered, we only find significant threshold
effects for three variables, namely firm investment, earnings volatility, and the absolute deviation ra-
tio. Additionally, the findings are not consistent with the financial constraint argument. Financially
constrained firms, such as those with large investment and volatile earnings, seem to have high ad-
justment speeds. These firms may adjust their capital structures quickly thanks to lower adjustment
costs that can be shared with transaction costs required to raise external funds. On the other hand, our
insignificant results regarding growth opportunities and firm size are inconsistent with recent evidence
in the literature about the impact of those variables on the SOA (e.g., Dang et al., 2011; Elsas and
Florysiak, 2011). Note, however, that the differences between our results and those reported by earlier
studies may be due to our novel modeling and testing approach in which we employ a more rigorous
threshold model and bootstrap-based test for the threshold effect. Finally, a limitation of the present
full-sample analysis is that it does not take into account the potential time-varying heterogeneity in the
SOA. Hence, in what follows, we examine this source of heterogeneity in the SOA, with a focus on the
effects of the Global Financial Crisis.
4.4 The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis
4.4.1 Regression Results for the Linear Partial Adjustment Model
We first examine the evolution of leverage over the sample period 2002–2012. Figure 1.a shows that,
as firms accumulated debt in the run-up to the crisis, the mean and median leverage ratios increased
gradually over the period 2005–2008, reaching their peaks in 2008 (25.6% and 19.2%, respectively).
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As the crisis intensified in 2008, corporate leveraging stopped and deleveraging began: in two years
2009 and 2010, firms reduced the mean and median leverage ratios by more than 2% to 23.2% and
17.6%, respectively. Over the recent period, 2011–2012, however, firms started to lever up again,
using as much debt as they did before the crisis. Overall, our results regarding the procyclical behavior
of leverage, especially our evidence of (de)leveraging around the crisis, are consistent with recent
evidence on Euro firms reported by the European Central Bank (2012). In Figures 1.b and 1.c, we
examine whether the impact of the crisis on a firm’s capital structure varies with the level of financial
constraint, measured by firm size and the SA index. We find that both constrained and unconstrained
firms leveraged up in the period leading to the crisis, before deleveraging in 2009 and 2010. The only
noticeable difference is that, for unconstrained firms (firms with large size and small SA scores), the
leveraging and deleveraging seemed more aggressive. This suggests that these firms may be able to
adjust their leverage ratios more easily than constrained firms. Our results regarding the procyclical
behavior of leverage for small and large firms seem consistent with recent evidence on net debt issues
(Covas and Den Haan, 2011).
In Table 6, we investigate the effects of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 on the SOA. As
outlined in Section 3.3, we adopt both the dummy-variable and sample-splitting approaches. In column
(1), we employ the first approach and report the results for model (12). The coefficient on the crisis
dummy variable, SOAFC, is significantly negative (-0.047), suggesting that firms move toward their
target leverage at a slower rate during the crisis. Specifically, the SOA is 34% in the noncrisis years
but declines to 29% in the crisis years. This finding supports our prediction that firms have difficulties
adjusting their capital structures due to limited access to external finance during the crisis.
Table 6 about here
The above approach relies on the assumption that the relationships between target leverage and
its determinants remain unchanged during the crisis period. To relax this assumption, in columns
(2) and (3), we estimate the SOA for two subperiods 2002–2006 and 2006–2010.22 We find that the
SOA for the pre-crisis period is 38% and the SOA for the crisis period is 14%. The difference in
the two adjustment speeds (24%) is considerably greater than the difference (5%) estimated using the
dummy-variable approach. These results indicate that employing the dummy-variable approach, which
22For brevity, we report the regression results for the target leverage model for the subperiods in Table A.2 of our
supplement.
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assumes homogeneous target leverage relationships, is likely to underestimate the effects of the Global
Financial Crisis.
Robustness Checks: Rolling-regression Analysis
To examine the robustness of the results, we perform a series of rolling regressions for seven five-
year subsamples, starting from 2002–2006 to 2008–2012. As mentioned, the minimum length of each
subsample is five years because we run GMM regressions that use lagged instruments. We summarize
the SOA estimates in Figure 2. The results reveal a clear downward trend in the SOA around the crisis
period. Between 2003 and 2010, the SOA gradually decreases, reaching a trough during the 2006–2010
period. It seems to increase over the period 2007–2011 and, in particular, the most recent period 2008–
2012, which consists of four post-crisis years (2009–2012). Overall, our rolling regression analysis
corroborates the evidence of the impact of the crisis on the SOA reported in Table 6. Taken together,
these findings suggest that the heterogeneous SOA estimates reported in Subsection 4.3 are unreliable
because they are time-invariant and as such do not properly account for a structural break due to the
Global Financial Crisis. Hence, we next reestimate the threshold model (6), thereby allowing for both
cross-sectional (regime-switching) and time-varying asymmetries in the SOA.
Figure 2 about here
4.4.2 Regression Results for the Threshold Partial Adjustment Model
In Tables 7 and 8, we estimate the threshold, partial adjustment model (6) for two subperiods, a pre-
crisis period (2002–2006) and a crisis period (2006–2010). Table 7 reports the regression results for
growth opportunities, investment, size, and earnings volatility. Table 8 presents the results for the SA
index as well as the (absolute) deviation, in levels and ratios. In each table, we report the results for the
pre-crisis period in Panel A and the results for the crisis period in Panel B. As in Tables 4 and 5, in each
panel we present the estimation and test results, as well as the relevant firm-specific characteristics of
firms that are categorized into the low and high regimes.
Results for Single Firm-Specific Variables
The results in Panel A of Table 7 provide strong evidence of threshold effects for all the transition vari-
ables under consideration. Specifically, during the pre-crisis period 2002–2006, firms with high growth
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opportunities, with large investment, of small size, and with volatile earnings have higher adjustment
speeds than those with the opposite characteristics. The differences in the SOA estimates, in the range
of 12%–18%, are both economically and statistically significant, with the statistical significance con-
firmed by the threshold (Wald) test results. Compared with the full-sample results, these differences
are markedly larger in magnitude, revealing a greater degree of cross-sectional heterogeneity in the
SOA during the pre-crisis period. Nevertheless, as in the full-sample analysis, our findings are incon-
sistent with the financial constraint argument, because more constrained firms, such as high-growth and
small firms and those with large investments and volatile earnings, adjust their capital structures more
rapidly than their less constrained counterparts. Our findings seem more in line with the cost-sharing
argument (Faulkender et al., 2012). Firms have higher SOA thanks to lower leverage adjustment costs
that they can share with the transaction costs of accessing capital markets. Indeed, we find that firms
with higher SOA estimates have larger financing deficits, which they offset by raising external funds,
equity finance in particular. In addition, these firms have significantly larger leverage (except for firms
with large investment) and larger target leverage deviations, hence potentially stronger incentives to
revert to their target leverage.
Table 7 about here
Turning to Panel B of Table 7, we find that, during the crisis period, the threshold effect becomes
less pronounced for two transition variables, investment and firm size, where the threshold test is
marginally rejected at 10%. Further, there is no threshold effect for the remaining variables, growth
opportunities and earnings volatility. Compared with the results in Panel A, the adjustment speeds in
both the low and high regimes seem to decline, which is consistent with the evidence of the negative
impact of the Global Financial Crisis documented in the previous subsection. Next, comparing the firm
characteristics in Subpanel B2 with those in Subpanel A2, we find that firms generally adjust at slower
rates because their external financing activities (net debt and equity issues) are curtailed during the
crisis. In some cases, firms not only reduce their net equity issued but also retire their debt, possibly
because they have to cut back investments (see columns (1) and (3) for firms with low growth and
capital expenditure). Note, however, the magnitude of the decrease in the SOA is regime-dependent.
Firms with high growth, with large capital expenditure, of small size, and with earnings volatility
experience a much larger decline in their adjustment speeds (in the range of 21%–29%). On the other
hand, firms with the opposite characteristics (i.e., those with low growth, with small investment, and
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of large size) see a more moderate drop in their SOA estimates (in the range of 18%–21%); the only
exception is firms with less earnings volatility, which experience a nontrivial decrease in the SOA (see
column (7)). The crisis exerts stronger effects on firms with higher SOA estimates possibly because
these firms are more constrained. These findings support our conjecture that the impact of the Global
Financial Crisis on a firm’s SOA increases with the degree of financial constraint facing the firm.
Results for Composite Measures of Financial Constraints and Target Leverage Deviations
In Panel A of Table 8, the SOA appears to be higher for firms with higher SA scores and smaller
deviations from target leverage (in both levels and ratios). However, we only document evidence of
asymmetry in the SOA conditional the SA index, as the threshold test is rejected at 1%. For the
deviation variables, the differences in the SOA are statistically insignificant as the threshold tests are
not rejected. These results are, thus, in conflict with the full-sample results reported in Table 5, in
which the SOA varies with the deviation ratio, but not with the SA index. This again suggests that the
full-sample results are likely to be misleading and must be taken with caution. Next, focusing on the
SA index, the finding that firms with high SA scores (i.e., more constrained firms) adjust their capital
structures more quickly than those with low scores (i.e., less constrained firms) corroborates our earlier
results and provides direct evidence against the financial constraint argument. A closer inspection of
the firm-specific characteristics reveals the same pattern documented in the previous subsections: firms
with higher SOA estimates tend to have much larger financing gaps, which they cover by actively
raising external funds. This observation is more consistent with the cost-sharing argument that the
leverage adjustment costs are relatively lower when they are shared with the costs of external finance.
Table 8 about here
Panel B of Table 8 shows that in the crisis years, most firms experience a decline in their adjustment
speeds, the only exception being firms with low SA scores, which see an increase in their SOA. The
former finding is consistent with the evidence of the negative impact of the crisis on the SOA, reported
in Tables 6 and 7. With a few exceptions, the decrease in the SOA seems to be mainly driven by
reduced external financing activities during the crisis. Next, the finding that firms with low SA scores
experience an increase in the SOA during the crisis is inconsistent with the previous results for firm
size, one component of the SA index (see column (5) of Table 7). Note that, although the SOA of
firms with low SA scores (i.e., more constrained firms) is now larger in magnitude than the SOA of
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firms with high SA scores (i.e., less constrained firms) (0.321 versus 0.154), there is no evidence of a
threshold effect. Thus, we continue to document little support for the financial constraint view.
Turning to columns (3)–(6), we observe significant threshold effects for the (absolute) deviation
variables (in both levels and ratios). Firms with small deviations from their target leverage barely adjust
their capital structures: the SOA estimates in columns (3) and (5) are both insignificant. In contrast,
firms with large deviations have significantly higher adjustment speeds (12% and 13%). During the
crisis period, when it is more costly to make leverage adjustments, firms seem little concerned about
small deviations from target leverage. They only have incentives to adjust their capital structures when
the deviations become sufficiently large. These findings are in contrast to the full-sample results for the
deviation ratio reported in Table 5. However, they are consistent with dynamic leverage rebalancing in
the presence of fixed adjustment costs. In addition, they are also in line with the results in Subpanel
B2 that firms with higher SOA estimates have significantly larger (absolute) deviations, in both levels
and ratios. As in the previous tables, here we document a similar pattern that firms with more rapid
adjustments have larger cash flows and financing deficits, which they offset via actively raising capital
externally. Further, we also find that these firms are over-levered, thus having stronger incentives to
revert to their target leverage.
Robustness Checks: Rolling-regression Analysis
To further examine the robustness of the results, we perform rolling regressions for seven five-year
subsamples, starting from 2002–2006 to 2008–2012. The results, summarized in Figure 3, reveal three
important patterns. First, consistent with the results in Tables 7 and 8, the Global Financial Crisis
has strong and robust, negative effects on the asymmetric adjustment speeds. Our findings here also
conform to the results for the linear case reported in Table 6 and Figure 2. Second, in Figures 3.a–3.d,
we find moderate evidence that the effects of the crisis on the SOA are asymmetric, as documented
in Tables 7 and 8. In particular, the effects seem more pronounced for firms with high growth, large
investment, of small size, volatile earnings, and low SA scores, i.e., those with high degrees of financial
constraints and higher adjustment speeds pre-crisis. Third, the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the
SOA, conditional on the transition variables, is most pronounced before the crisis but becomes weaker
both economically and significantly in and around the crisis years. The only two exceptions are the
results regarding the absolute deviation, where the cross-sectional variation in the SOA is strongest
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during the crisis period (Figures 3.f and 3.g). Overall, our results provide strong evidence of time-
varying heterogeneity in the SOA, the heterogeneity caused by the effects of Global Financial Crisis.
There is, however, moderate evidence of cross-sectional variation in the SOA.
Figure 3 about here
5 Conclusions
Dynamic trade-off models of capital structure predict that firms facing differential adjustment costs
may take different paths toward their target leverage, thereby rendering the SOA heterogeneous. In
this paper, we employ dynamic threshold partial adjustment models of leverage to estimate the het-
erogeneous adjustment speeds for firms with differential adjustment costs, under different regimes and
different stages of the business cycle. Specifically, we examine whether the SOA varies with several
firm-specific variables that may affect the adjustment costs, namely growth opportunities, investment,
firm size, earnings volatility, the Size–Age index, and deviations from target leverage. Further, we
study whether the SOA is time-varying and is negatively affected by the Global Financial Crisis.
Using a recent sample period between 2002 and 2012, we obtain the following major findings.
First, we document strong and robust evidence of time-varying heterogeneity in the SOA but relatively
weaker evidence of cross-sectional variation, especially for the whole sample period. Consistent with
our prediction, firms adjust much more slowly during the Global Financial Crisis. However, for the
full sample period, there is limited evidence of threshold effects and asymmetric capital structure ad-
justments conditional on the firm-specific variables proxying for financial constraints. Second, in our
subperiod analysis, we document moderate cross-sectional heterogeneity in the SOA, which is gen-
erally more pronounced in the pre-crisis years than in crisis years. For the pre-crisis period, more
constrained firms, such as those with high growth, with large investment, of small size, with volatile
earnings, and with a higher Size–Age index adjust their capital structures faster than their less con-
strained counterparts. For the crisis period, there is limited evidence on cross-sectional asymmetry in
the SOA, conditional on the deviation from target leverage. While firms with a large deviation attempt
to move toward their target leverage, albeit with slow speeds, those with a small deviation make no
such attempt. Finally, comparing the pre-crisis with crisis results, we find that the effects of the cri-
sis on the adjustment speeds are asymmetric: they are more pronounced for firms with high degrees
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of financial constraints and higher adjustment speeds pre-crisis. Overall, our study reveals complex
patterns of time-varying and cross-sectional asymmetries in capital structure adjustments, which are in
line with dynamic trade-off models.
Our study provides two implications for capital structure studies. First, we show that it is important
to allow for both cross-sectional and time-varying heterogeneity in the SOA. In our study, the time-
series variation in the SOA is more dominant than the cross-sectional variation. This suggests that
research on asymmetric capital structure adjustments that assumes time-invariant adjustment speeds
may produce inaccurate estimates of the SOA. Second, inconsistent with our predictions, we find that
constrained firms have a higher SOA than unconstrained firms. However, the former firms tend to
have large financing deficits, which they offset through external financing activities. These results
are in line with the idea that firms can adjust faster, at potentially lower adjustment costs that can be
shared with the transaction costs of raising external funds. This argument suggests that the leverage
adjustment costs may not be fully proxied by firm-specific measures of financial constraints and that
they should be benchmarked against the capital market transaction costs (Faulkender et al., 2012).
On the other hand, we demonstrate significantly negative effects of supply-side constraints on capital
structure adjustments when exploiting the exogenous credit shock triggered by the Global Financial
Crisis. This suggests that supply-side, external measures of financial constraints may play a more
important role than firm-specific measures in determining the SOA.
Finally, we conclude with some limitations and avenues for future research. While our study is
focused on testing the trade-off theory, it is silent on alternative views of capital structure such as the
pecking order theory, the market timing, and inertia hypotheses. Our empirical work is based on an
extension of the partial adjustment model of leverage; however, this model has difficulty distinguishing
between active target adjustment behavior and mechanical mean reversion (Chen and Zhao, 2007;
Chang and Dasgupta, 2009). Hence, it would be interesting for future research to extend our empirical
model into a more general approach and estimation method that is able to test alternative theories of
capital structure and to account for potential mechanical mean reversion of leverage.
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Figure 1: Evolution of Leverage
The following figures present the time-series of leverage over the sample period 2002–2012. Figure 1.a presents the mean
and median leverage ratios. Figures 1.b reports the leverage ratios of small and large firms, respectively. Figure 1.c reports
the leverage ratios of firms with a low Size-Age (SA) index and a high (SA) index, respectively.
a. Leverage
b. Small Firms versus Large Firms
c. Low SA Index versus High SA Index
Figure 2: Time-series Variation in the Speed of Adjustment
The following figure presents the time-series variation in the speed of adjustment (SOA) in the linear partial adjustment
model (1). The SOA estimates are obtained using the two-step GMM estimator from seven rolling regressions, each for a
five-year subsample; the first subsample is 2002–2006 and the last subsample is 2008–2012.
SOA
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Figure 3: Time-series Variation in the Asymmetric Speed of Adjustment
The following figures report the time-series variation in the asymmetric speed of adjustment (SOA), estimated for the low
and high regimes (L, H) of the threshold partial adjustment model (6). The SOA estimates are obtained using the two-step
GMM estimator from seven rolling regressions, each for a five-year subsample; the first subsample is 2002–2006 and the
last subsample is 2008–2012.
a. Growth Opportunities b. Investment
c. Size d. Earnings Volatility
e. SA Index f. Absolute Deviation
g. Absolute Deviation Ratio
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Median Stdev Min Max Skew Kurt
Leverage 51,894 0.245 0.181 0.263 0.000 1.000 1.345 4.342
Profitability 51,894 -0.093 0.043 0.364 -1.213 0.227 -2.052 6.363
Growth Opportunities 51,894 3.111 1.260 7.701 0.243 59.253 5.919 40.277
Depreciation 51,894 0.048 0.036 0.048 0.000 0.327 2.869 14.537
Tangibility 51,894 0.288 0.197 0.264 0.000 0.944 0.923 2.728
Size 51,894 5.053 5.211 2.780 -2.329 10.597 -0.312 2.852
R&D Dummy 51,894 0.546 1.000 0.498 0.000 1.000 -0.185 1.034
R&D Expenditure 51,894 0.066 0.000 0.167 0.000 1.014 3.984 20.258
Industry Median Leverage 51,894 0.173 0.182 0.104 0.000 0.489 0.195 2.335
Investment 49,948 0.156 0.000 0.495 0.000 4.069 5.836 41.557
Earnings Volatility 33,988 0.395 0.062 1.644 0.009 13.565 6.883 52.340
SA Index 51,894 -2.739 -3.076 1.114 -3.918 1.698 1.783 6.582
Cash Flow 51,248 -0.288 0.020 1.267 -8.954 0.445 -5.537 35.494
Financing Deficit 46,934 0.106 0.005 0.410 -0.820 2.456 3.520 19.599
Net Debt Issued 51,238 0.011 0.000 0.211 -1.000 0.960 0.079 14.717
Net Equity Issued 47,561 0.086 0.001 0.286 -0.162 1.787 4.071 21.246
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the variables considered in the paper. Obs, Stdev, Skew, and Kurt are
the number of observations, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis, respectively. The data set is a panel of US firms
collected from the Compustat database for the period 2002–2012. Following Flannery and Rangan (2006) and most re-
cent capital structure studies (Faulkender et al., 2012; Strebulaev and Yang, 2013), we define the variables used in the
target leverage model (2), as follows. Leverage is the ratio of total debt, including debt of both long-term and short-
term maturities, to total assets ((dlt+dltt)/at). Profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total
assets ((ib+ xint+ txt)/at). Growth opportunities (market-to-book) is the ratio of total liabilities plus the market value
of equity to total assets ((dlc+dltt+ pstkl+ csho∗ prcc_ f )/at). Depreciation is the ratio of depreciation to total as-
sets (d p/at). Tangibility is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets (ppent/at). The industry median
leverage ratio is calculated based on Fama and French’s 49 industry groupings. R&D expenses is the ratio of R&D ex-
penses to total assets (xrd/at). The R&D dummy variable is equal to 1 if the firm did not report R&D expenses and
0 otherwise. Size is the natural log of total assets, measured in 2000 dollars (ln(at ∗CPI2000/CPI)), where CPI is the
consumer price index). The rest of the variables are measured as follows. Investment is capital expenditure less depre-
ciation divided by lagged fixed assets ((capx−d p)/l.ppent) (Aivazian et al., 2005). Earnings volatility is the volatility
of profitability calculated for the past 10 years (minimum 3 years of data required) (Strebulaev and Yang, 2013). The
SA index is the Size and Age index calculated as
(−0.73∗ lnTA+0.043∗ lnTA2−0.040∗Age), where Age is the age
of the company since the IPO date and is capped at 37 (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010). Cash flow is the ratio of operating
income before depreciation less total taxes and interest to the lagged value of total assets, less ind_capex, which is the
industry median of net investment ((oibd p− xint− txt)/l.at− ind_capex) (Faulkender et al., 2012). Financing deficit is
the sum of net debt and equity issued, where net debt issued is the ratio of the change in current and long-term debt to
total assets (((dlc+dltt)− (l.dlc+ l.dltt))/at) and net equity issued is the ratio of net equity issuance to total assets
((sstk− prstkc)/at) (Strebulaev and Yang, 2013).
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Table 2: Regression Results for Target Leverage and (One-stage) Partial Adjustment Models
Target Leverage Model Partial Adjustment Model
Independent Variable POLS FE AH-IV GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Leverage - - 0.687∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗
- - (0.028) (0.024)
Profitability -0.177∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Growth Opportunities 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Depreciation 0.495∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗ -0.239∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.057) (0.076) (0.074)
Size 0.009∗∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Tangibility 0.046∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ -0.025 -0.030
(0.005) (0.016) (0.022) (0.021)
R&D Dummy 0.024∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.005 -0.003
(0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
R&D Expenses -0.017 0.022 -0.032 -0.021
(0.015) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024)
Industry Median of Leverage 0.616∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗ -0.289∗∗∗ -0.264∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.038) (0.048) (0.046)
Time Dummies No No Yes Yes
Implied SOA - - 0.313 0.287
Observations 45,662 45,662 39,430 39,430
Adj. R-squared 0.17 0.11 - -
Hausman Test - 1130.26 [0.00] - -
AR(2) Test - - -0.39 [0.70] -0.34 [0.74]
Sargan Test - - - 84.5 [0.00]
Notes: SOA is the speed of adjustment. POLS and FE are the pooled OLS and fixed-effects estimators, respectively. AH-
IV stands for the Anderson-Hsiao just-identified instrumental variable estimator and GMM refers to the two-step GMM
estimator. Hausman test is a test for potential significant differences in the fixed-effects (FE) and random effects (RE)
estimations, and is asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no difference. AR(2) test is a test for the second-order
serial correlation, and is asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan test is a test
for the null of valid instruments and is asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null. ***, **, and * indicate significance
of the coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Figures in (·) are the standard errors of the coefficients and
those in [·] are the p-values of the test statistics. See notes to Table 1 for variable definitions.
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Table 3: Partial Adjustment Model of Leverage – Two-Stage Estimation
POLS FE AH-IV GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SOA 0.183∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.010) (0.024) (0.020)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
First Differences No No Yes Yes
Observations 45,662 45,662 39,430 39,430
Adj. R-squared 0.09 0.09 -
AR(2) Test - - 0.23 [0.82] 0.26 [0.80]
Sargan Test - - - 88.64 [0.00]
Notes: SOA is the speed of adjustment. POLS and FE are the pooled OLS and fixed-effects estimators, respectively. AH-
IV stands for the Anderson-Hsiao just-identified instrumental variable estimator and GMM refers to the two-step GMM
estimator. See Table 2 for notes about the AR(2) and Sargan diagnostic tests. ***, **, and * indicate significance of the
coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Figures in (·) are the standard errors of the coefficients and those
in [·] are the p-values of the test statistics. See also notes to Table 1 for variable definitions.
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Table 4: Dynamic Panel Threshold Model of Leverage Conditional on Single Firm Characteristics
Transition Variable Growth Opportunities Investment Size Earnings Volatility
Regime Low High Low High Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Estimation and Test Results
SOA 0.303∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.040) (0.024)
Observations 10,503 41,391 35,558 16,336 22,831 29,063 4,964 46,930
Threshold (Coverage) 0.81375 (23%) 0.16066 (81%) 5.22180 (50%) 0.02511 (17%)
Confidence Interval [0.81363,0.81386] [0.16031,0.16084] [5.21969,5.22228] [0.02510,0.02513]
AR(2) Test 0.23 [0.81] 0.24 [0.81] 0.22 [0.83] 0.22 [0.82]
Sargan Test 78.36 [0.00] 71.70 [0.01] 39.33 [0.00] 38.26 [0.00]
Threshold Test 1.92 [0.16] 7.64 [0.01] 1.83 [0.17] 3.84 [0.04]
Panel B. Firm Characteristics
Leverage 0.216 0.253a 0.252 0.230a 0.224 0.262a 0.276 0.242a
Deviation -0.031 0.004a 0.005 -0.036a -0.021 0.012a 0.013 -0.006a
Absolute Deviation 0.136 0.189a 0.173 0.191a 0.211 0.144a 0.129 0.183a
Absolute Deviation Ratio 0.622 0.974 0.895 0.893 1.167 0.636a 0.522 0.943
Cash Flow -0.034 -0.354a -0.208 -0.469a -0.620 -0.021a 0.054 -0.325a
Financing Deficit 0.007 0.132a 0.070 0.187a 0.204 0.027a -0.005 0.118a
Net Debt Issued -0.012 0.017a 0.005 0.026a 0.018 0.006a 0.006 0.012b
Net Equity Issued 0.018 0.104a 0.057 0.151a 0.159 0.029a -0.010 0.096c
Notes: SOA is the speed of adjustment. All models are estimated in first differences by the two-step GMM and include
time dummies. The confidence interval for the threshold parameter estimate is obtained using Hansen’s (1999) approach.
See Table 2 for notes about the AR(2) and Sargan diagnostic tests. Threshold test is a test under the null of no threshold
effect; its p-value is evaluated by a bootstrap-based procedure. ***, **, and * indicate significance of the coefficients at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels. a, b, and c indicate that firm characteristics in the low and high regimes are statistically different
from each other at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Figures in (·) are the standard errors of the coefficients and those in [·] are
the p-values of the statistics. See also notes to Table 1 for variable definitions.
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Table 5: Dynamic Panel Threshold Model of Leverage Conditional on Composite Measures of Finan-
cial Constraints and Target Leverage Deviations
Transition Variable SA Index Absolute Deviation Absolute Deviation Ratio
Regime Low High Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Estimation and Test Results
SOA 0.340∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.019) (0.050) (0.020) (0.025) (0.020)
Observations 6,850 45,044 8,675 43,219 25,236 26,658
Threshold (Coverage) -3.65169 (15%) 0.06420 (22%) 0.97441 (64%)
Confidence Interval [-3.65169,-3.64875] [0.06418,0.06425] [0.97427,0.97449]
AR(2) Test 0.24 [0.81] 0.22 [0.83] 0.30 [0.77]
Sargan Test 70.59 [0.01] 72.97 [0.00] 69.88 [0.01]
Threshold Test 0.10 [0.76] 0.70 [0.43] 6.10 [0.02]
Panel B. Firm Characteristics
Leverage 0.266 0.242a 0.231 0.248a 0.246 0.245
Deviation 0.009 -0.007a -0.004 -0.004 -0.025 0.033a
Absolute Deviation 0.122 0.188a 0.032 0.218a 0.115 0.286a
Absolute Deviation Ratio 0.518 0.974c 0.177 1.098a 0.446 1.693a
Cash Flow 0.056 -0.341a -0.030 -0.341a -0.184 -0.389a
Financing Deficit -0.011 0.124a 0.031 0.121a 0.073 0.138a
Net Debt Issued 0.007 0.012c 0.007 0.012b 0.016 0.007a
Net Equity Issued -0.016 0.102a 0.023 0.099a 0.048 0.123a
Notes: SOA is the speed of adjustment. All models are estimated in first differences by the two-step GMM and include
time dummies. The confidence interval for the threshold parameter estimate is obtained using Hansen’s (1999) approach.
See Table 2 for notes about the AR(2) and Sargan diagnostic tests. Threshold test is a test under the null of no threshold
effect; its p-value is evaluated by a bootstrap-based procedure. ***, **, and * indicate significance of the coefficients at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels. a, b, and c indicate that firm characteristics in the low and high regimes are statistically different
from each other at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Figures in (·) are the standard errors of the coefficients and those in [·] are
the p-values of the statistics. See also notes to Table 1 for variable definitions.
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Table 6: Linear Partial Adjustment Model of Leverage – The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis
Dummy-variable Sample-splitting
Approach Approach
Pre-crisis Period Crisis Period
(1) (2) (3)
SOA 0.338∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.026) (0.049)
SOAFC -0.047∗∗∗
(0.011)
Observations 39,430 18,499 13,347
AR(2) Test 0.25 [0.80] 0.97 [0.43] -0.68 [0.49]
Sargan Test 38.00 [0.02] 14.43 [0.11] 9.19 [0.10]
Notes: SOA is the speed of adjustment. In column (1), SOAFC captures the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the
SOA: it is the coefficient on the crisis dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the year is between 2007 and 2009, and 0
otherwise. In columns (2) and (3), the pre-crisis period is 2002–2006 and the crisis period is 2006–2010. All models are
estimated in first differences by the two-step GMM; the regressions in columns (2) and (3) also include time dummies. The
confidence interval for the threshold parameter estimate is obtained using Hansen’s (1999) approach. See Table 2 for notes
about the AR(2) and Sargan diagnostic tests. Threshold test is a test under the null of no threshold effect; its p-value is
evaluated by a bootstrap-based procedure. ***, **, and * indicate significance of the coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels. Figures in (·) are the standard errors of the coefficients and those in [·] are the p-values of the statistics. See also
notes to Table 1 for variable definitions.
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Table 7: Dynamic Panel Threshold Model of Leverage Conditional on Single Firm Characteristics –
Results for the Pre-crisis and Crisis Periods
Transition Variable Growth Opportunities Investment Size Earnings Volatility
Regime Low High Low High Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Pre-crisis Period
A1. Estimation and Test Results
SOA 0.296∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.045) (0.033) (0.043) (0.048) (0.037) (0.050) (0.034)
Observations 15,800 8,295 15,574 8,521 3,046 21,049 8,136 15,959
Threshold (Coverage) 3.40798 (83%) 0.18760 (85%) 2.03460 (16%) 0.11414 (72%)
Confidence Interval [3.39866,3.41217] [0.18456,0.18760] [2.01967,2.04408] [0.11409,0.11418]
AR(2) Test 0.89 [0.37] 0.93 [0.35] 0.96 [0.34] 0.84 [0.40]
Sargan Test 13.67 [0.19] 14.44 [0.15] 10.86 [0.37] 13.05 [0.22]
Threshold Test 10.60 [0.00] 9.27 [0.00] 10.63 [0.00] 5.15 [0.03]
A2. Firm Characteristics
Leverage 0.234 0.283a 0.250 0.252 0.368 0.233a 0.236 0.258a
Deviation -0.005 -0.008 0.002 -0.040a 0.045 -0.015a -0.002 -0.009c
Absolute Deviation 0.157 0.287a 0.175 0.204a 0.319 0.155a 0.140 0.213a
Absolute Deviation Ratio 0.722 1.415a 0.760 1.255a 1.597 0.710a 0.634 1.023a
Cash Flow -0.032 -0.893a -0.242 -0.474a -2.008 -0.076a 0.044 -0.512a
Financing Deficit 0.035 0.269a 0.084 0.167a 0.526 0.051a -0.001 0.174a
Net Debt Issued 0.002 0.024a 0.006 0.016a 0.067 0.001a 0.001 0.014a
Net Equity Issued 0.033 0.213a 0.068 0.140a 0.376 0.052a -0.001 0.144a
Panel B. Crisis Period
B1. Estimation and Test Results
SOA 0.104∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.078 0.237∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.049) (0.053) (0.051) (0.060) (0.058) (0.087) (0.049)
Observations 2,752 20,587 13,871 9,468 4,770 18,569 1,798 21,541
Threshold (Coverage) 0.66017 (15%) 0.17490 (79%) 3.48630 (26%) 0.02407 (15%)
Confidence Interval [0.66017,0.66057] [0.17451,0.17686] [3.48410,3.48765] [0.02407,0.02414]
AR(2) Test -0.68 [0.50] -0.69 [0.49] -0.73 [0.46] -0.68 [0.50]
Sargan Test 13.20 [0.21] 10.83 [0.37] 19.06 [0.04] 15.42 [0.12]
Threshold Test 0.80 [0.39] 2.78 [0.10] 2.94 [0.10] 1.11 [0.30]
B2. Firm Characteristics
Leverage 0.174 0.246a 0.252 0.216a 0.261 0.232a 0.286 0.233a
Deviation -0.056 0.016a 0.011 -0.029a 0.009 0.000c 0.023 0.000a
Absolute Deviation 0.128 0.188a 0.174 0.186a 0.244 0.154a 0.130 0.182a
Absolute Deviation Ratio 0.641 0.867a 0.802 0.914a 1.147 0.717a 0.517 0.861a
Cash Flow -0.054 -0.301a -0.185 -0.403a -1.032 -0.073a 0.054 -0.299a
Financing Deficit 0.007 0.115a 0.055 0.174a 0.315 0.047a -0.011 0.112a
Net Debt Issued -0.017 0.016a -0.001 0.031a 0.027 0.008a 0.003 0.013c
Net Equity Issued 0.024 0.092a 0.049 0.135a 0.239 0.044a -0.012 0.092a
Notes: SOA is the speed of adjustment. All models are estimated in first differences by the two-step GMM and include
time dummies. The confidence interval for the threshold parameter estimate is obtained using Hansen’s (1999) approach.
See Table 2 for notes about the AR(2) and Sargan diagnostic tests. Threshold test is a test under the null of no threshold
effect; its p-value is evaluated by a bootstrap-based procedure. ***, **, and * indicate significance of the coefficients at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels. a, b, and c indicate that firm characteristics in the low and high regimes are statistically different
from each other at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Figures in (·) are the standard errors of the coefficients and those in [·] are
the p-values of the statistics. See also notes to Table 1 for variable definitions.
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Table 8: Dynamic Panel Threshold Model of Leverage Conditional on Composite Measures of Finan-
cial Constraints and Target Leverage Deviations – Results for the Precrisis and Crisis Periods
Transition Variable SA Index Absolute Deviation Absolute Deviation Ratio
Regime Low High Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Pre-crisis Period
A1. Estimation and Test Results
SOA 0.268∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.046) (0.135) (0.033) (0.052) (0.032)
Observations 15,990 8,105 2,236 21,859 8,385 15,710
Threshold (Coverage) -1.64512 (84%) 0.04588 (16%) 0.88126 (60%)
Confidence Interval [-1.65225,-1.64185] [0.04536,0.04665] [0.88095,0.88155]
AR(2) Test 0.92 [0.36] 0.84 [0.40] 0.81 [0.42]
Sargan Test 11.18 [0.34] 11.11 [0.13] 11.15 [0.13]
Threshold Test 7.83 [0.00] 0.45 [0.50] 0.69 [0.40]
A2. Firm Characteristics
Leverage 0.224 0.303a 0.231 0.252a 0.248 0.252
Deviation -0.014 0.041a -0.002 -0.006a -0.017 0.011a
Absolute Deviation 0.155 0.321a 0.023 0.210a 0.106 0.290a
Absolute Deviation Ratio 0.714 1.593a 0.112 0.987a 0.398 1.520a
Cash Flow -0.014 -0.951a -0.061 -0.349a -0.226 -0.375a
Financing Deficit 0.035 0.269a 0.045 0.120a 0.081 0.130a
Net Debt Issued 0.003 0.021a 0.007 0.010 0.015 0.006a
Net Equity Issued 0.032 0.214a 0.035 0.100a 0.059 0.113a
Panel B. Crisis Period
B1. Estimation and Test Results
SOA 0.321∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.043 0.133∗∗∗ -0.044 0.118∗∗
(0.105) (0.048) (0.066) (0.049) (0.099) (0.052)
Observations 2,935 20,404 10,945 12,394 6,274 17,065
Threshold (Coverage) -3.68594 (16%) 0.27178 (82%) 0.69367 (47%)
Confidence Interval [-3.68633,-3.68578] [0.27138,0.27193] [0.69309,0.69957]
AR(2) Test -0.67 [0.50] -0.81 [0.42] -0.82 [0.41]
Sargan Test 14.20 [0.16] 8.04 [0.33] 6.37 [0.50]
Threshold Test 2.42 [0.13] 5.19 [0.03] 5.10 [0.03]
B2. Firm Characteristics
Leverage 0.271 0.233a 0.192 0.278a 0.263 0.228a
Deviation 0.010 0.001c -0.042 0.204a -0.009 0.013a
Absolute Deviation 0.123 0.188a 0.119 0.442a 0.086 0.258a
Absolute Deviation Ratio 0.510 0.893a 0.615 1.787a 0.325 1.270a
Cash Flow 0.056 -0.320a -0.084 -0.442a -0.139 -0.321a
Financing Deficit -0.016 0.119a 0.049 0.151a 0.048 0.122a
Net Debt Issued 0.001 0.014a 0.005 0.018a 0.002 0.016a
Net Equity Issued -0.014 0.098a 0.039 0.123a 0.037 0.101a
Notes: SOA is the speed of adjustment. All models are estimated in first differences by the two-step GMM and include
time dummies. The confidence interval for the threshold parameter estimate is obtained using Hansen’s (1999) approach.
See Table 2 for notes about the AR(2) and Sargan diagnostic tests. Threshold test is a test under the null of no threshold
effect; its p-value is evaluated by a bootstrap-based procedure. ***, **, and * indicate significance of the coefficients at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels. a, b, and c indicate that firm characteristics in the low and high regimes are statistically different
from each other at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Figures in (·) are the standard errors of the coefficients and those in [·] are
the p-values of the statistics. See also notes to Table 1 for variable definitions.
45
